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Abstract
Recent advances in adversarial attacks have shown that ma-
chine learning classifiers based on static analysis are vulnera-
ble to adversarial attacks. However, real-world antivirus sys-
tems do not rely only on static classifiers, thus many of these
static evasions get detected by dynamic analysis whenever
the malware runs. The real question is to what extent these
adversarial attacks are actually harmful to the real users? In
this paper, we propose a systematic framework to create and
evaluate realistic adversarial malware to evade real-world sys-
tems. We propose new adversarial attacks against real-world
antivirus systems based on code randomization and binary
manipulation, and use our framework to perform the attacks
on 1000 malware samples and test four commercial antivirus
software and two open-source classifiers. We demonstrate
that the static detectors of real-world antivirus can be evaded
24.3%–41.9% of the cases and often by changing only one
byte. We also find that the adversarial attacks are transferable
between different antivirus up to 16% of the cases. We also
tested the efficacy of the complete (i.e. static + dynamic)
classifiers in protecting users. While most of the commercial
antivirus use their dynamic engines to protect the users’ de-
vice when the static classifiers are evaded, we are the first to
demonstrate that for one commercial antivirus, static evasions
can also evade the offline dynamic detectors and infect users’
machines. Our framework can also help explain which fea-
tures are responsible for evasion and thus can help improve
the robustness of malware detectors.
1 Introduction
Malware attacks continue to be one of the most pressing secu-
rity issues users face today. Recent research showed that dur-
ing the first nine months of 2019, at least 7.2 billion malware
attacks and 151.9 million ransomware attacks have been re-
ported.1 The traditional signature-based method cannot keep
1https://www.msspalert.com/cybersecurity-research/sonic
wall-research-malware-attacks-2019/
up with this rampant inflation of malware. Hence commercial
antivirus companies started using machine learning [7, 40].
Machine-learning-based detectors are scalable and efficient
at protecting against the huge influx of malware, which is
why since the first paper in 2001 on detecting malware using
machine learning [55], there has been an explosion of aca-
demic research papers on predicting malicious content using
machine learning, many of them flaunting high accuracy and
being able to detect new malware unseen during the training
[6, 12, 48, 51, 54].
On the flip side, research has also demonstrated that
machine-learning-based detectors can be easily evaded by
making trivial changes to a malware [2, 4, 9, 10, 15–17, 20,
22, 23, 25–27, 29, 31–35, 38, 39, 45, 47, 52, 53, 57, 58, 60, 61].
The results in adversarial attacks are especially significant in
the malware domain where there are already existing adver-
saries trying to evade detection using commercial packers and
crypters [4, 18].
We argue that research on the adversarial attack against
malware detection has not yet convincingly demonstrated
that adversarial attacks are harmful to users. Specifically, we
notice the following shortcomings:
1. The attacks do not generate actual malware: The ma-
jority of the prior attacks are performed only on the fea-
ture vectors, without actually modifying the malware
binaries [2, 10, 21]. Attacks performed in the feature
space might not be able to translate to actual binaries.
Some of these adversarial modifications can corrupt mal-
ware format or affect functionality.
2. The attacks do not verify the modified malware:
Some previous research [4] uses transformations that, in
theory, should preserve functionality but in practice (e.g.
obfuscation tricks) even supposedly safe transformations
break functionality. Therefore, it is crucial to verify the
malicious behaviors of adversarial samples. However,
no paper on Windows malware systematically checked if
the functionalities of the modified malware were still pre-
served. Moreover, all the real world antivirus products
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use both static and dynamic classifiers. Demonstrating
only static evasion is not enough to show real-world ram-
ifications of adversarial attacks because static adversarial
samples can still be blocked by dynamic classifiers based
on their runtime behaviors.
3. The attacks consider unrealistic adversaries: Among
14 papers on adversarial attacks on windows malware, 9
papers [3, 10, 14, 26, 28, 30, 35, 56, 58] performed white-
box attacks and 5 papers [4, 18, 20, 52, 53] performed
blackbox attacks. The whitebox attack scenario on com-
mercial AVs is unrealistic because attackers cannot ob-
tain insider knowledge. Even for the blackbox attack
scenario, some papers assume that the adversaries know
the features used by the target model [20, 21], and some
assume that they have access to the confidence score of
decisions from a model under attack [34, 61]. However,
commercial antivirus products do not expose features or
return the confidence score.
4. The attacks do not explain why evasion happened:
We found only one paper tried interpreting the decisions
of a blackbox deep neural network model, MalConv [59],
using integrated gradients [15]. However, the paper ma-
nipulated the byte-level features without manipulating
the actual file. Their explanation also cannot be used for
other malware detectors that do not use only byte-level
features.
Moreover, adversarial examples provide a unique opportu-
nity to understand how malware detectors work. None of the
current work paper investigated which feature changes lead to
the adversarial evasions on commercial antivirus. Identifying
the fragile features responsible for adversarial evasions can
help us improve the robustness of malware detectors.
In this paper, we seek to answer the following research
questions:
• RQ1: How robust are the commercial antivirus engines
against adversarial examples of windows malware?
• RQ2: How can we explain the commercial antivirus
engines using adversarial examples?
• RQ3: Given that antivirus often employs a combina-
tion of static and dynamic classifiers, how harmful are
adversarial attacks to the end users?
To answer these questions, we propose an open-source au-
tomatic framework that provides generic actions to modify
windows malware binaries to evade a variety of static malware
detectors (Section 3). This framework integrates a sandbox to
verify the functionalities of generated evasive examples. We
use our framework to test four top antivirus engines according
to PCMag [46], one signature-based open-source AV (Cla-
mAV), and one machine-learning-based classifier (EMBER).
We find that even with a completely blackbox attack, where
an adversary only has external access to a system, the static
classifiers of commercial antivirus engines can be evaded
24.3%–41.9% of the cases (Section 4).
Generating these adversarial examples are surprisingly easy.
We find that more than 80% of the adversarial samples are
generated only using a single action, 2% - 19% of which only
need to change 1 byte (e.g., append 1 byte in a particular
section, or change one byte of section name) (Section 4.3).
On average, a blackbox adversary has to spend about 13–61
seconds to generate these adversarial malware samples. These
adversarial attacks are transferable among different malware
detectors. We find that the adversarial samples generated
using one malware detector can evade other malware detectors
up to 16% of the cases (Section 4.3.3).
Although our adversarial examples are not designed to
evade dynamic detection employed by antivirus products, we
indeed observed that one out of four commercial AV products
failed to detect our adversarial examples during execution,
indicating flaws in its dynamic detection component (Sec-
tion 4.3.4).
In summary, our contributions are as follows:
• An open-source2 framework for generating adver-
sarial examples for commercial antivirus: Our frame-
work can automatically generate and verify functional
adversarial malware.
• A novel algorithm for explaining why evasion hap-
pens: We propose a novel explanation algorithm to re-
veal the root cause for evasive samples for many different
kinds of malware detectors. It identifies the minimum
number of features needed to be changed to alter the
decision of a malware detector. Our technique is generic
for any malware detectors.
• Measuring harm to end-users: We are the first to mea-
sure how harmful adversarial examples can be to end-
users. Our results show that for one out of four antivirus
engines we tested, we found that adversarial ransomware
samples that evade static classifier can also evade its of-
fline dynamic classifier and encrypt user files. This result
shows that to demonstrate real harm, research in adver-
sarial attacks should focus on evading the entire antivirus
pipelines, instead of only the static classifiers. On the
other hand, antivirus systems should provide offline dy-
namic detection to protect users against static adversarial
attacks.
2 Problem
2.1 Threat Model
We follow the study by Carlini et al. [8] to describe our threat
model, from three aspects: adversarial goal, adversarial capa-
bilities, and adversarial knowledge.
2https://github.com/bitsecurerlab/adversarial_malware.g
it
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Adversarial Goal. The adversary’s goal is to manipulate mal-
ware samples to evade the detection of static PE malware clas-
sifiers. Other types of malware like PDF malware or Android
malware are not within the scope of this study. This is an
untargeted attack because we only consider a binary classifi-
cation (benign or malicious) not specific malware families in
this classification task and we are only interested in causing
the malicious samples to be classified as benign.
Adversarial Capabilities. In this work, we assume that the
adversary does not have access to the training phase of the
malware classifiers. For instance, the adversary cannot inject
poisonous data in the training dataset.
In addition, the adversary cannot arbitrarily change the
input data. In most scenarios of adversarial attacks, such as
image recognition, the adversary is required to make only
“small” changes to the original sample to keep the manipu-
lation visually imperceptible. However, when attacking
malware classification, the restriction is not on the number or
size of changes, but on the preservation of malicious function-
ality. If “small” changes on a malware sample indeed confuse
a malware classifier but prevent the malware from acting ma-
liciously, this manipulation is not considered successful.
Adversarial Knowledge. Based on what knowledge the ad-
versary can obtain, the adversarial attack can be divided into
two types: 1) whitebox attacks in which the adversary has
unlimited access to the model; and 2) blackbox attacks in
which the adversary has no knowledge about the model and
can obtain the classification results only through a limited
number of attempts. A classification result can be a score or
simply a label.
In this work, we consider an adversary with only blackbox
access. The adversary does not know anything about the
internals of the deployed classifiers, can perform a limited
number of attempts to the classifiers and can observe the
classifiers’ actions when the samples are considered malicious.
Commercial antivirus systems delete malicious samples. If
a file gets deleted, the adversary can be certain that the AV
considered the file malicious. However, if the file does not
get deleted the adversary cannot be certain that the file is
considered benign because it might get uploaded to the cloud
for in-depth processing. For the purpose of our experimental
setup where we only use offline antivirus systems, we assume
that if a file is not deleted by an AV, the AV considers it as
benign.
2.2 Problem Definition
We aim to automatically generate adversarial examples for
malware classifiers and explain the root cause of the evasions.
The problem can be split into two sub-problems: adversarial
example generation and feature interpretation.
Adversarial Example Generation. We aim to manipulate
a malware sample without breaking its malicious function-
alities, such that the malware classifier misclassify it as a
benign-ware.
Let malware classifier be a mapping f that maps from a
binary sample s to a classification label. It outputs 1 if s
is a malware, and outputs 0 if s is a benignware. We then
design the action set A = {a1,a2, . . . an} that can be used to
safely manipulate the malware samples. We also design a
verifier function v(s,s′) to check if the behaviors of a malware
sample s are preserved for modified sample s′. It outputs 1
if the modified sample s′ preserves the functionalities of the
original sample s. Otherwise, it outputs 0 if the functionalities
are altered.
Our goal is to select an action sequence seq =
{a1,a2, . . . am} from Action Set A such that when applied
to sample s, the probability of f (s′) = 0 and v(s,s′) = 1 is
maximized.
Feature Interpretation. We want to pinpoint why a classi-
fier misclassified an adversarial sample by identifying the
group of features that are responsible for changing the deci-
sion. However, we do not know the features used by black
box malware classifiers. All we can control is the manip-
ulation actions used to generate adversarial examples. Let
s be a malware sample, seq = {a1,a2, . . . am} be the action
sequence used to generate an adversarial example s′, and
F = { f1, f2, . . . fk} be the changed features between s and s′.
The problem is, given s and seq, how to find out a minimal
subset of F that is essential to the evasion?
3 Methodology
3.1 Action Set and Features
At first, we define the actions that can be applied to malware to
create adversarial samples, as shown in Table 1. Every action
manipulates a set of features that a classifier uses to detect
malware. For a blackbox model, we do not know the exact
features the classifier is using. However, we can make an
educated guess, by examining open-source malware detectors
such as EMBER and ClamAV, about the categories of features
necessary for detecting malware. We assume three large
categories of features: hash-based signatures (file hash and
section hash), rule-based signatures (section count, section
name, section padding, debug info, checksum, certificate, and
code sequences) and data distribution based features (byte
histogram, and byte entropy histogram).
Macro-actions. We use the actions proposed by Anderson
et al. [4] that do not break the functionality of malware sam-
ples (Table 1). We also adopt a code randomization action
(CR) from Pappas et al. [44]. It is a defense method originally
proposed to prevent Return Oriented Programming (ROP) at-
tack. This approach breaks the chains of code gadgets that
ROP attacks use by making narrow-scope code transforma-
tions statically. Since all transformations are equivalent and
do not alter the locations of the basic blocks, it is considered
3
Table 1: Action Set is the collection of macro and micro actions that are used to generate adversarial examples. Micro actions are
modified macro actions such that the number of features impacted is reduced.
Type Abbr Name Description
Macro
OA Overlay Append Appends benign contents at the end of a binary
SP Section Append Appends random bytes to the unused space at the end of a section.
SA Section Add Adds a new section with benign contents.
SR Section Rename Change the a section name to a name in benign binaries.
RC Remove Certificate Zero out the signed certificate of a binary.
RD Remove Debug Zero out the debug information in a binary.
BC Break Checksum Zero out the checksum value in the optional header.
CR Code Randomization Replace instruction sequence with semantically equivalent one
Micro
OA1 Overlay Append Appends 1 byte at the end of a binary
SP1 Section Append 1 Byte Appends 1 byte to the unused space at the end of a section.
SA1 Section Add 1 Byte Adds a new section with 1 byte content.
SR1 Section Rename 1 Byte Change 1 byte of a section name.
CP1 Code Section Append 1 Byte Appends 1 byte to the unused space at the end of the code section.
Table 2: Affected Features by Actions. Each action that is applied to a binary can impact multiple features.
CR OA SP SA SR RC RD BC OA1 SP1 SA1 SR1 CP1
Hash-Based
Signatures
F1: File Hash X X X X X X X X X X X X X
F2: Section Hash X X X X X
Rule-based
Signatures
F3: Section Count X X
F4: Section Name X X
F5: Section Padding X
F6: Debug Info X
F7: Checksum X
F8: Certificate X
F9: Code Sequence X
Data Distribution F10: Data Distribution X X
a safe randomization method for binaries. In our case, we use
it as an adversarial attack technique to break the code patterns
that may serve as rule-based features for detecting malware.
Micro-actions. Micro is a relative concept. If an action a
changes feature set F = { f1, f2, . . . fk} of a malware sample,
then another action that only changes a subset of F is a micro-
action of a. We implement 5 micro-actions for macro-action
OA, SP, SA, SR and CR. Table 2 shows all the actions used
in our framework and the corresponding affected features
for each action. Take the action Section Append (SP) as an
example, by looking up Table 2, we get that SP action affects
features File Hash (F1), Section Hash (F2) and Rule-Based
Signatures in the section padding data(F5). F1, F2 are affected
if any modification is made to the file and section content. F5
may be affected if SP action modifies the padding content
that may contain body-based signatures.
3.2 Workflow
The workflow includes 3 steps: adversarial example genera-
tion, action sequence minimization, and feature interpretation
(Figure 1).
Firstly, to generate adversarial samples we randomly se-
lect and apply macro-actions to change the original samples.
Macro actions affect a large number of features, thus ensures
the probability of the original sample crossing the decision
boundary is higher.
Secondly, we remove unnecessary macro-actions from the
action sequence to generate a minimized evasive sample. This
step is necessary to identify the cause of evasion. After action
sequence minimization, we know the relative effectiveness of
the macro-actions for causing evasions. Due to some obfusca-
tion tricks in malware samples, supposedly safe actions may
still break functionality. Removing redundant actions also
helps to reduce the possibility of generating broken samples.
Thirdly, to gain fine-grained insights into the cause of the
evasion, we need to disentangle the macro-actions into micro-
actions and find the precise reason for the evasion. We traverse
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every macro-action in the minimized action sequence, and try
to replace it with different micro-actions. In this way, more
new samples are generated around the adversarial sample.
Using the feature changes of each new sample and its classifi-
cation label, we can explain how the classification decision is
made, and which features are essential to the evasion.
Benign
Malicious
a1
a2
a3
S
S23 S123
S13
S2’3
S2’3’
S2’3’’
            apply a macro-action
            remove a redundant macro-action
            replace a macro-acton with a micro-action
Figure 1: Workflow. The seed malware sample S resides
in the malicious region of the feature space. We perform a
sequence of single actions a1, a2 and a3 until the generated
sample S123 successfully reaches the benign region. S123 is an
adversarial example. In the feature interpretation phase, first,
we remove useless actions. The action a2 is essential, because
by removing action a2, the generated sample S13 is no longer
evasive. The action a1 is useless because by removing action
a1, the generated sample S23 has no effect in the classifier’s
decision. Then we disentangle macro actions into micro ones.
a2 can be replaced with micro-actions a′2. a3 can be replaced
with micro-actions a′3 or a
′′
3 . we generated three samples S2′3,
S2′3′ and S2′3′′ . Finally, we have an adversarial sample S2′3′′
with a minimized action sequence (a′2,a
′′
3).
3.3 Framework
Our framework consists of five modules: Binary Rewriter,
Static Classifier, Action Sequence Minimizer, Verifier and
Feature Interpreter (Figure 2). As inputs, the framework uses
original malware samples, a set of actions that can be applied
to a malware sample, and a set of content that can be added
when applying actions that require the addition of new content.
For each input malware sample, the Binary Rewriter chooses
one action from the action set and applies this action to the
malware sample and rewrites the binary. The Static Classifier
tests this rewritten binary to determine if it is classified as ma-
licious. The process is repeated until the malicious sample is
classified as benign. The Action Sequence Minimizer reduces
the redundant actions that have no contribution to evasions.
The Verifier validates the minimized evasive samples. If the
functionalities of the evaded sample are similar to the original
sample, we call it the adversarial sample. Lastly, the Feature
Interpreter disentangles the large actions into smaller micro-
actions to ensure a small number of features are affected. The
next couple of subsections elaborate on each module in detail.
3.3.1 Binary Rewriter
The Binary Rewriter generates multiple variants of an original
malware sample and interacts with static classifiers to test if
the generated samples evade detection. We design two types
of manipulations to rewrite a malware file: in-place code
randomization and code-agnostic manipulation that changes
the malware file headers, sections and overlay data.
Adversarial Example Generation. With the two types of
manipulation actions, we now describe how to generate the
evasive examples (see Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1: Adversarial Example Generation
Input :malware sample s, malware classifier f
Output :evasive examples seva
1 Initialize action set A, max actions on single sample
max_attempt, max action sequence length max_length, wait
time on VM T , probability p to select saved action content.
2 s′← s
3 W ← getActionWeights( f )
4 for _ ∈ {1, . . . ,max_attempt} do
5 action← randomSelect(A, W )
6 content← selectContent(p)
7 s′← applyAction(s′, action,content)
8 copyToVM(s′)
9 while True do
10 isExt← checkExistedOnVM(s′)
11 isMod← checkModifiedByVM(s′)
12 if !isExt or isMod then
13 break
14 else
15 if curTime− s′.creatTime≥ T then
16 seva← s′
17 return seva
18 end
19 end
20 end
21 if len(getActionSeq(s′)) ≥ max_length then
22 s′← s
23 end
24 end
For a seed malware sample s, we aim to generate a variant
of the sample as seva, such that it evades the target classifier
( f (seva) = 0) while preserving the original malicious behav-
iors (v(s,seva) = 1). We apply various actions iteratively until
we get an evasive sample or the total number of attempts ex-
ceeds max_attempt. For each attempt, an action is randomly
selected according to weights W from the action set. If the
selected action requires content (for example, a new content is
required for the Section Add action), we select content from
the content set (generated in Algorithm 3) for that action with
probability p or generate random content with probability
1− p. The Binary Rewriter generates a new binary with the
chosen actions applied to the original samples. This rewritten
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Rewriter
Malware 
Samples
Verifier Adversarial 
Samples
Evasive
Samples
Action 
Sequence
Minimizer
Action 
Set
Detected
Samples
Static 
Classifier
Content
Set
weights
new successful content
Feature
Interpreter
Figure 2: Framework. This framework takes as input original malware samples, a set of actions that can be applied to a
malware sample, and a set of content that can be added when applying actions that require adding new content. As output, it
produces evasive samples that are marked benign by the Static Classifier and that preserve the functionality of the original sample.
Additionally, these evasive samples are further analyzed to learn about features of the Static Classifier.
sample is copied to the shared folder of a virtual machine
(VM) with Static Classifier installed. If the Static Classifier
detects the sample, it either deletes the sample or disinfects it.
A sample is considered “evasive” if it is neither detected nor
disinfected (MD5 checksum does not change) by the Static
Classifier after a fixed time T .
We restrict the number of actions to a certain length (
max_length) to ensure that the size of the rewritten binary
does not grow too large for our sandbox. The sandbox we are
using, the Cuckoo sandbox, does not support the analysis of
extremely large binaries. Also, it reduces the possibility that
the generated sample is broken by one of these actions.
3.3.2 Action Sequence Minimizer
The Action Sequence Minimizer aims to remove unnecessary
actions from the action set to produce a “minimized” sample
using only actions required to make the original malware
sample evasive. Details about this module can be found in
Algorithm 3 in Appendix A.
With minimized samples, we design two strategies to reuse
effective actions: 1) increasing the weights of effective actions
to increase their probability of getting selected during the ran-
dom selection process of the Binary Rewriter, 2) reusing both
the action sequence and associated content to new samples.
For a successful action sequence q = (a1,a2, ...) of an eva-
sive malware sample seva, we traverse every action ai in q try-
ing to remove the action and get a shorter sequence. Then, we
apply the new sequence on the original sample s to generate
a new sample s′. To replay the same actions as in generating
seva, we first find the action log using the action index, then
parse the log to get the action content, such as the new sec-
tion content in action Section Add. We apply all actions in
the shorter sequence with corresponding action content. The
function isEvasive( f ,s′) (the same procedure between line 9
and 20 in Algorithm 1) is used to determine whether s′ can
still evade the target classifier f . If so, we consider the action
ai useless in generating evasive sample seva, and remove ai
from the action sequence. If not, we consider the action ai
as an essential action. We need to increase the weight of ai
in W to select ai with a higher possibility in the future, and
also save the corresponding content to reuse later. When all
the useless actions are removed from the sequence q, the re-
maining action sequence is the minimized sequence, and the
corresponding sample smin is the minimized sample.
To calculate the weights of the actions, for each classifier
we collect a set of minimized sequences. For each action
ai ∈ A, we count the number of occurrences in sequences
as Nai . Then, the weight of an action ai is calculated as
Nai
∑nj=1 Na j
,ai,a j ∈ A. The weights are used in Binary Rewriter
when randomly selecting actions.
3.3.3 Verifier
The Verifier is used in two phases: 1) to select the original
malware sample to ensure that the samples demonstrate mali-
cious behavior and 2) to check whether the functionalities of
the evasive sample are still intact.
The Verifier uses the Cuckoo sandbox to verify the func-
tionalities of the malware. The Cuckoo sandbox collects the
behaviors of samples and converts them into readable descrip-
tive signatures. Each signature is a text string summarizing
one specific behavior of a sample. Some examples of sig-
nature are “Drops 2302 unknown file mime types indicative
of ransomware writing encrypted files back to disk (50 out
of 2280 events)”, or “Resumed a suspended thread in a re-
mote process potentially indicative of process injection (4
events).” It also provides a maliciousness score based on the
behavior. The Verifier considers a sample as malicious if its
maliciousness score is higher than a threshold, which is 7 for
our experiments. To compare the malicious behaviors of our
minimized samples with the original samples, we compare
the behaviors of the minimized sample with the original one.
If a minimized sample (classified as benign) has the same
behaviors as the original one, we consider it as an evasive
6
example.
Specifically, suppose the original sample s has a signature
set G, and the evasive sample seva has a signature set Geva.
We check each signature in G and search in Geva to see if
the same signature exists in Geva. We count the total num-
ber of the similar signatures in G and Geva as hits(G,Geva).
The behavior similarity between two samples is defined as
sim(G,Geva) =
hits(G,Geva)
#G . If the sim(G,Geva) ≥ 0.8 , the
Verifier considers the two samples s and seva share the same
behaviors. Otherwise, the Verifier considers the manipulation
has changed the behaviors of the original sample. We do not
set the threshold of similarity to 1 because the behaviors of
binaries may vary slightly during different executions.
Algorithm 2: Feature Interpretation
Input :malware sample s, adversarial sample sadv
Output :essential feature set for the evasion
essential_ f eatures
1 q← getActionSeq(smin)
2 action_idxs← [0, . . . , len(q)−1]
3 kept_idx_micro← []
4 essential_ f eatures← []
5 foreach idx ∈ action_idxs do
6 action← q[idx]
7 alter_micros←getAlterMicroActions(action)
8 q′← q
9 foreach micro ∈ alter_micros do
10 q′[idx]← micro
11 foreach kept_idx,kept_micro ∈ kept_idx_micros do
12 q′[kept_idx]← kept_micro
13 end
14 s′← s
15 foreach action ∈ q′ do
16 content← parseLog(action.idx)
17 s′← applyAction(s′,action,content)
18 end
19 if isEvasive( f , s′) then
20 kept_idx_micros.append(idx,micro)
21 f eature← actionFeatureMapping(micro)
22 essential_ f eatures.append( f eature)
23 end
24 end
25 end
26 return essential_ f eatures
3.3.4 Feature Interpreter
A single action may change multiple features and can have a
varying impact on a classifier. From an attacker’s perspective,
we only know if a particular action causes an evasion, but
we do not know which feature change is responsible for the
evasion. To gain insights into the cause of the evasion, we
need to break one large action into several micro-actions.
Take action Section Append (SP) as an example, Figure 3
If SP← OA1, then feature = File Hash
Else If SP← SP1, then feature = Section Hash
Else feature = Section Padding
(a) SP
if SA← OA1, then feature = File Hash
Else If SA← SA1, then feature = Section Count
Else If SA← OA, then feature = Data Distribution
Else feature = Section Count & Data Distribution
(b) SA
If CR← OA1, then feature = File Hash
Else If CR← CP1, then feature = Section Hash
Else feature = Code Sequence
(c) CR
If RD← OA1, then feature = File Hash
Else If RD← CP1, then feature = Section Hash
Else feature = Debug Information
(d) RD
If SR← OA1, then feature = File Hash
Else If SR← SR1, then feature = Section Name
Else feature = Part of Secton Name
(e) SR
If OA← OA1, then feature = File Hash
Else feature = Data Distribution
(f) OA
If BC← OA1, then feature = File Hash
Else feature = Checksum
(g) BC
If RC← OA1, then feature = File Hash
Else feature = Certificate
(h) RC
Figure 3: Decision rules are used to map actions to feature
space, which enables us to understand the cause of evasion.
(a) shows how we break it into micro-actions. First, by look-
ing up Table 2 to see that SP changes feature set F consisting
of features related to File Hash (F1), Section Hash (F2) and
Section padding (F5). The actions that only change a subset
of F are one-byte overlay append (OA1) that changes F1 and
one-byte section append (SP1) that changes F1,F2. They are
alternative actions of SP. Starting from the minimum change,
we try to replace SP with OA1 and check if the file is still
evasive (denoted as SP← OA1). If so, we can conclude the
essential effect of SP is breaking file hash (F1). If not, we
then replace SP with SP1. If still evasive, the essential effect
of SP is breaking section hash (F2). Otherwise, the evasion is
breaking signatures in Section Padding (F5).
The Feature Interpreter accepts a sample s and correspond-
ing adversarial sample sadv as input, and try to replace each
action used in sadv one after another with alternative actions
if possible (Algorithm 2). Specifically, for each action, it
first finds all the alternative actions from Table 2, and then
replaces the action with one micro action at a time. If after
the replacements, the new sample is still evasive, we then
keep the new minimized sample. Otherwise, we try the rest of
the actions and repeat the replacement and validation process
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until all macro-actions are processed.
4 Evaluation
4.1 Experiment Setup
Dataset: In this paper, we generate adversarial examples for
Windows PE binaries. To ensure the executability and func-
tionality of the generated samples, the format and constraints
of PE files must remain intact.
To guarantee the quality of malware samples, we randomly
select 1000 samples from VirusTotal that meet the following
requirements: 1) More than 80% antivirus engines of Virus-
Total label them malicious. 2) Top 5 antivirus engines label
those samples as malicious. 3) The execution of those sam-
ples in a Cuckoo sandbox shows malicious behavior. Presence
of malicious behaviour is ensured using the malicious score,
which is computed by Cuckoo Sandbox as a weighted sum of
identified signatures.
Some malware samples may detect a VM and not execute,
while others may connect to a C&C servers that is not longer
available. Such samples, while labeled malicious, do not
display malicious behavior.
Visual Basic (VB) programs are excluded from the dataset
because the IDA Pro in the implementation of code random-
ization [44] cannot generate CFG for them. These implemen-
tation issues are left as future work.
Setup: The experiments are performed on a desktop computer
with Intel R© CoreTM i5-6400 CPU @ 2.70 GHz x 4, 16 GiB
RAM, 1TB SSD, Ubuntu 18.04.3 LTS. All the scripts such
as Binary Rewriter, Action Sequence Minimizer, Feature
Interpreter, and result analysis are implemented in Python
3.6.9. The Binary Rewriter also requires pefile and IDA Pro
6.8. For all the antivirus software under testing, free versions
and default settings are used. We choose four real-world
commercial antivirus software for blackbox testing, which
are anonymized as AV1, AV2, AV3, AV4. Each antivirus is
installed on a guest machine (Windows 7 Version 6.1 Build
7601: Service Pack 1) in Virtualbox 5.2.32.
The network of the virtual machine is disabled for two rea-
sons: 1) to ensure the malware will not infect other machines
in the network and 2) to ensure the stability and reproducibil-
ity of our experiments. Network connected commercial AVs
are continually updated based on the samples they scan, which
can impact the evasion results over time.
We also choose two open-source models as baselines:
• EMBER [6] is an open-source machine-learning-
based classifier that uses a tree-based classifier model
LightGBM to detect malware. It generates a 2350-
dimensional feature vector for each sample consisting
of two main types of features: raw features (e.g. Byte-
Histogram, ByteEntropyHistogram, Strings) and parsed
features (e.g. GeneralFileInfo, HeaderFileInfo, Section-
Info, ImportsInfo, ExportsInfo). We use the implemen-
tation provided by Endgame in Machine Learning Static
Evasion Competition (MLSEC) [41].
• ClamAV [11] (0.102.1) is an open-source signature-
based antivirus engine that utilizes hash-based and rule-
based signatures to detect malware. All the generated
signatures for a file are available.
4.2 Adversarial Example Generation
4.2.1 Evasion Rate
To test the effectiveness of adversarial examples of both a
state-of-the-art classifier and antivirus software, we measure
detection rate and evasion rate as follows.
Detection Rate Rd : measures the fraction of the original
samples that a static malware scanner can detect. That is,
detection rate Rd = Nd/N, where Nd is the number of the
detected original samples and N is the total number of samples
under testing.
Evasion Rate Re: measures the fraction of verified adver-
sarial malware that a static malware scanner failed to detect.
That is, evasion Rate Re = Ne/Nd , where Ne is the total num-
ber of verified adversarial malware that successfully evades
a static malware scanner and Nd is the number of detected
samples.
Table 3 shows the evasion ability of adversarial examples
of different malware classifiers. From these results we can
see that:
• For classifier EMBER, the evasion rate is the highest at
56.0%, which is much higher than the result of Anderson
et al. [4]at only 10%-24%. When generating adversarial
examples, their strategy aims at selecting correct actions
at each step, while our strategy selects actions and con-
tent. Section 4.2.3 demonstrates the impact of selective
content on the evasion rate for EMBER.
• ClamAV is much harder to evade, although its detection
rate is also the lowest amongst the classifiers in this study.
Our framework can only obtain a 17.2% evasion rate for
the detected malware samples. However, this does not
mean ClamAV is the most robust AV. On the contrary,
with open source signatures, it is feasible to scan the
target malware using a sliding window to find the byte
sequences that match these signatures, and then to design
customized actions to break these signatures. This would
be an ad-hoc approach and not fair to other machine-
learning-based models or closed-source AVs. We aim to
provide a generic and automatic approach for all types
of AV. Moreover, we find that for ClamAV, when the
size of a rewritten binary exceeds 25 MB, the sample is
always classified as benign. This case is not considered
a successful evasion as it reveals not unreliable features
but a design limitation.
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Table 3: Evasion results show for each AV, the detection rate, the evasion rate, and the number of evasive and functional samples.
The average time required to generate samples and the average number of actions required for each sample are shown.
Detection Rate # Evasive # Functional Evasion Rate AVG Time AVG Action Count (Before/After Mini)
EMBER 83.0% 486 467 (96.1%) 56.0% 21.9 s 5.33 / 2.06
ClamAV 78.4% 142 135 (95.1%) 17.2% 13.1 s 4.1 / 1.07
AV1 95.2% 279 274 (98.2%) 28.8% 22 s 5.14 / 1.92
AV2 100% 369 345 (93.5%) 34.5% 35.4 s 5.51 / 1.57
AV3 99.6% 436 417 (95.6%) 41.9% 50.7 s 6.45 / 2.44
AV4 93.6% 250 227 (90.8%) 24.3% 61 s 5.05 / 1.34
• For commercial antivirus systems, the evasion rates are
in the range from 24.3% to 41.9%, which shows that the
static scanning of current antivirus products is easy to
evade using our framework.
4.2.2 Functionality Verification
Some rewritten samples lose their functionality after manip-
ulations. Examples of broken samples can be found in Ap-
pendix C.
Table 3 shows the number of evasive samples and func-
tional samples. A sample may evade static scanning either
because it has fooled the classifier or because it is no longer
malicious due to the manipulations. As shown, even with
carefully designed actions and minimizers that reduce redun-
dant actions, it is still possible that evasive samples become
nonfunctional. The functional rate ranges from 90.8% to
98.2%.
4.2.3 Estimated Cost to the Adversary
We compute the number of queries and the time required for
an adversary to generate a successful adversarial sample.
The evasion rate increases as the number of attempts in-
crease (Figure 4). For ClamAV and commercial antivirus
products, our framework reaches a relatively stable evasion
rate after 30 attempts. But for EMBER, which is a machine-
learning-based model, the evasion rate keeps increasing even
after 50 attempts. We also noticed that the signature-based
ClamAV has the lowest evasion rate, the ML-based EMBER
has the highest evasion rate. The commercial AVs usually
use both signature and machine learning models, and their
evasion rates are between ClamAV and EMBER.
For commercial AVs, each attempt requires copying ver-
ified adversarial sample to a VM to check whether or not
the sample is deleted by the AV within T seconds. For Cla-
mAV and Ember, each attempt requires directly querying an
ML model (EMBER) or a native Linux program (ClamAV),
which is much quicker (Table 3). Sample generation is accel-
erated by placing multiple samples in the VM for evaluation
in parallel.
As shown in Figure 5, the cost to the adversary is substan-
tially reduced when action weights and successful content are
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Figure 4: Evasion rate increases with the number of attempts
but for most AVs, the evasion rate plateaus at about 30 at-
tempts, indicating that additional manipulations are not fruit-
ful. The evasion rate for EMBER, however, keeps increasing
beyond 50% as the number of attempts is increased.
used to manipulate original samples as they result in more
successful samples in fewer attempts. This figure only shows
the result of EMBER because the improvement of EMBER
with weight and content is the most outstanding. The im-
provements of others are under 3%.
4.2.4 Action Sequence Length
According to our experiments, minimization halves the action
sequence lengths for most samples (Table 3), resulting in
majority of evasive samples requiring at most 3 actions.
This result demonstrates that using random search is suf-
ficient for generating effective adversarial examples. Tech-
niques such as reinforcement learning [4] do not provide
additional improvement over random search.
4.2.5 Number of bytes changed
To measure the difference between the adversarial example
and the original malware, we compute the total number of
bytes appended or modified to generate the adversarial exam-
ple.
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Figure 5: With weighted actions and selective content, more
evasive samples can be generated with fewer attempts.
By positioning the samples in a line sorted by byte changes
(Figure 6), we noticed that:
• By only changing one byte of the original malware, we
can generate 90 evasive samples for ClamAV, 34 for
AV1, 20 for AV2, 9 for AV3 and 11 for AV4.
• EMBER is not vulnerable to small changes. As a
machine-learning-based model, it represents the target
malware sample as a high-dimension feature vector (i.e.
2350 features), where tiny modifications of the vector
are less likely to cause any significant impact in the fea-
ture space. Big changes that make the features appear
similar to benign features (e.g append a large amount
of benign content at the end of the sample), can move
the vector from malicious region to benign region in the
feature space and cause a misclassification.
In Figure 7, we show 4 special cases comparing the binary
content differences between the original malware samples and
the generated evasive examples. In all cases, the difference
is within 4 bytes. We can renaming the section from “idata"
to “rdata", to cause an evasion, as shown in case (a). Or, we
can remove the 4-byte debug information to cause another
evasion, as shown in case (d). It indicates that the features
used by static scanners are very fragile and superficial.
4.3 Explanation
4.3.1 Verification of Action-Feature Space Mapping us-
ing ClamAV
Using the decision rules of Figure 3, the Feature Interpreter
extracts the essential feature changes for each macro-actions.
Although the classification process of the black box AVs
is unknown, the open-source ClamAV can be used for this
validation.
For example, our framework reports the evasion reason for
13 samples is feature F5 (Section Padding) (see Table 2). For
these 13 samples, the ClamAV all report them are caused
by feature F5 too. This indicates that our explanations of all
these 13 samples are correct. We then validated the remaining
features reported by our framework, 21 samples for F1, 62
samples for F2, 1 sample for F3, 2 samples for F4, 17 samples
for F6, 11 samples for F9, all of them are reported by ClamAV
due to the breaking of the same reasons as the framework
reports.
4.3.2 Explaining Why Evasion Happens
Understanding why evasion happens can help improve the
robustness of a classifier against adversarial examples. In gen-
erating an adversarial sample for a target blackbox classifier,
some of the actions can be removed without affecting the eva-
siveness of the sample, or can be replaced by micro-actions.
To reveal the essential reason that causes the evasion, we use
Action Sequence Minimizer and Feature Interpreter to find
the minimum changes to evade the classifier.
We summarize the minimized actions used for all evasive
samples among different classifiers, as shown in Figure 10 in
Appendix B, and cross-reference it with the Action-Feature
mapping in Table 2 to count the features changed in all sam-
ples, as shown in Figure 8.
1) For EMBER, more than 80% of evasive samples are gen-
erated using Overlay Append (OA). The OA action can affect
multiple features, such as Byte Histogram (256 dimensions),
Byte Entropy Histogram (256 dimensions), and Strings (104
dimensions). These features all belong to the data distribution
feature category in our Action-Feature.
2) For ClamAV, the most effective actions are SP1, OA1,
RD, SP, and CR. All of these actions impact hash based
and rule-based signatures Table 2, which may exist in debug
directory, special padding content or code sections.
3) For commercial AVs, the most effective action for AV1,
AV3 and AV4, and also the second most effective action for
AV2 is SA1. While this action corresponds to either breaking
file hash or breaking the section count, the major cause for
evasion for all AVs is section count, as seen in Figure 8. It is
reassuring that commercial AVs do not use only file hash to
differentiate malware and benign programs, but they still use
the fragile feature section count.
As in Figure 8, AV1 and AV4 are not sensitive to data
distribution change, but for AV2 and AV3, the data distribu-
tion change is the most important reason for the evasions of
adversarial samples. This maybe because for AV2 and AV3,
machine learning-based models are employed more heavily
while AV1 and AV4 rely more on signature-based models.
OA1 action can be used to generation 6 and 7 evasive samples
for AV3 and AV4, respectively. This implies that these AVs
have no mechanisms other than a file hash feature to identify
these particular malware samples.
4.3.3 Transferability
Transferbility refers to the property that allows the same
adversarial examples to fool multiple models. If the adversar-
ial examples are transferable, then evading one classifier also
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Figure 6: Number of Changed Bytes of Adversarial Examples. By changing only one byte, adversarial examples are created for
all tested AVs, with the exception of EMBER, which is not vulnerable to a few bytes of change in the binary.
(a) Section Rename (b) Break Checksum
(c) Code Randomization (d) Remove Debug
Figure 7: Difference in binary content when various actions are applied.
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Figure 8: Feature changes that cause evasion. EMBER is
most impacted by data distribution changes, which also im-
pact AV2 and AV3 heavily. Half of all ClamAV evasions
changed the section hash, and section count changes impacted
all commercial AVs.
imperils the other one.
Figure 9 shows the percentage of evasive samples generated
for one classifier that can also evade other classifiers. From
this table, we can see that 1) The evasive samples generated
for AV3 have the highest transferability to other classifiers, es-
pecially to AV1 (16.55%). 2) The evasive samples generated
for AV4 have the lowest transferability to other AVs while
the evasive samples generated for other AVs have a much
higher chance to transfer to AV4 (i.e. 1.32% vs 8.76%, 7.05%
vs 14.49%, 8.81% vs 13.19%). 3) None of the adversarial
samples generated for ClamAV transfer to EMBER. Simi-
larly, AV1 and AV4’s samples do not transfer to EMBER. It
indicates that ClamAV, AV1 and AV4 do not rely (much) on
machine learning models for static malware detection, or use
machine learning models in a very different way. This is fur-
ther confirmed by Figure 8, which shows that data distribution
changes, which are associated with evading machine learning
models, are not very effective at generating evasive samples
for AV1 and AV4.
4.3.4 Testing Harm to Users
We want to test to what extent adversarial examples evade
the full AV pipeline and infect users. We hypothesize that
the dynamic and behavioral classifiers of the AVs will detect
and stop the adversarial examples evading the the static-only
classifiers when they are executed, thus, posing no real harm
to the users. To answer this question, we create adversar-
ial samples by modifying 30 ransomware samples and test
whether the samples that evade static classifiers can infect
users’ machines. We select the ransomware samples from our
dataset by choosing samples whose Cuckoo sandbox signa-
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Figure 9: Transferability of adversarial samples. 16% of sam-
ples that were generated using AV3 also evade AV1. AV3’s
samples show the highest transferability to other AV, while
AV4’s samples show the lowest. AV4 is also the most recep-
tive to adversarial samples generated using other AVs.
ture reports contain “ransomware” or “writing encrypted files
back to disk.” To test the adversarial ransomware, we place
several decoy files (selfie.png and taxes.docs in the Desktop
folder) in the VM and executed the adversarial ransomware.
Explicit observable malicious behaviour, such as change in
the content of the decoy files, or notifications from the ransom
indicates the successful execution of ransomware.
For AV1, AV3, AV4, blocked the execution of adversarial
ramsomware samples – none of the samples can encrypt the
user’s personal files. However, AV2 is the exception. All of
the 30 adversarial ransomware samples evade the behavior
detector of AV2; files are encrypted and blackmail messages
are shown on the screen. AV2 shows alert for 4 samples but
does not stop the encryption for any of the 30 samples.
We then connect to the Internet and redo the experiment
for all the antivirus. We can still evade the static scanner of
AV1. AV2 can detect all the samples this time. We have
contacted the R&D team of AV2 regarding our findings. They
stated their products rely heavily on cloud techniques since
they think malware authors can easily reverse engineer the
AV in offline mode. We think devices should be protected
even when offline. An attacker might apply other techniques
to disconnect the Internet or use a USB to load the malware to
the victim machine and execute the sample. Without offline
protection, the malware sample might infect a machine and
cause damage to it.
This represents a new attack surface for adversarial ex-
amples and a recommendation for future antivirus systems.
Anti-virus systems rely on both static and dynamic detection
to detect malware. However, since static detectors are easy
to evade, AVs need a robust dynamic detection to protect
users from malicious programs. Three of the four antivirus
systems we tested already provide this protection, however,
one system did not have a robust offline dynamic detection to
detect the adversarial malware when they are executed.
5 Discussions
Triviality of Defense. The triviality of the defense depends
on the type of attack. To defend the overlay append attack, the
defender can ignore the overlay data when training models. To
defend the SA attack, the defender can lower the importance
of benign features in models, and only consider malware
features. To defend the RD, RS, BC attack, the defender
should avoid using such fragile patterns as malware features.
The code randomization (CR) attack is hard to defend because
the defender cannot locate the small striped of binary that is
randomized.
Recommendation for Antivirus Systems. Our attacks
demonstrate that some antivirus systems still rely on frag-
ile signature-based detection for some type of malware. This
practice can make them vulnerable to trivial adversarial at-
tacks. We recommend redesigning the malware features, re-
ducing fragile features, incorporating dynamic features of
malware. It will provide better protection to the compute
when static scanners fail. Another important point to note
is the reliance on static-only classifiers. Several prior work
show high accuracy for a static-only malware detector that
might inspire commercial systems to heavily rely on static
classifiers. However, we demonstrate that static classifiers are
easy to evade, thus dynamic classification is crucial to protect
users from harm.
Recommendation for Researchers. We demonstrate how
adversarial examples can be used to explain how a complex
blackbox system makes decisions. When training malware
classifiers, the researchers should use explanation techniques
to understand the behaviors of the classifiers and check if
the learned features are fragile features that can be easily
evaded or conflict with expert knowledge. We also argue that
for security applications, demonstrating harm to real users is
crucial to understand the real ramification of an attack.
Fully automatic generation of adversarial malware. In
some cases, automatically generating an adversarial malware
against a real-world system might be difficult. When an an-
tivirus system detects a malware, it usually actively delete it
or disinfect it in static scanning. However, sometimes it may
take a long time to react to certain malware, or some antivirus
products do not delete samples without user interactions. This
will block the generation of adversarial examples as well as
reduce the throughout of the framework. To mitigate this, we
can either wait a long time for the antivirus system to take
action or write Marco scripts to simulate user delete actions.
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6 Related Work
Adversarial attacks on machine learning is a rapidly grow-
ing field. Since 2014, there has been more than 1200 papers
on adversarial attacks and defense3. However, only 35 pa-
pers focused on the malware domain, the rest focuses on
the image domain. These works performed attacks on An-
droid malware [16, 25, 29, 32, 34, 39, 43, 47, 60], PDF mal-
ware [10, 17, 38, 61], Windows malware (PE files) [2, 4, 9, 15,
20,22–24,26,27,31,33,35,45,52,53,57,58], IoT malware [1]
and Flash-based malware [37]. The recent papers performed
both whitebox attacks where the adversary has complete con-
trol of the machine learning model and black box attacks
where the adversary has limited control. The black box at-
tacks usually use a surrogate model to construct the attacks,
which is then transferred to another model. Because of the
transferability of machine learning models [36, 42], an adver-
sarial sample generated from one machine learning model can
often fool another model with different structure and parame-
ters. Attackers can train a local surrogate model to substitute
for the target model, allowing them to bypass the black-box
constraint and generate adversarial samples in a white-box
setting. However, though this approach is successful in the
image domain, we demonstrate that in the malware domain,
adversarial examples that evade an open-source surrogate
model are unlikely to evade commercial antivirus systems.
Prior work proposed various ways of constructing adver-
sarial attacks against a variety of machine-learning-based
systems. Xu et al. [61] used genetic algorithms to generate
evasive PDF malware samples. Dang et al. [13] proposed
a hill-climbing-based evasion method, EvadeHC, to gener-
ate PDF files that can evade PDF malware classifiers. The
goal of their approach is to find a sample that has crossed the
boundary of the detector but not the boundary of the tester.
Hu et al. [21] used Generative Adversarial Networks (GAN)
to generate adversarial examples against a black-box model.
Their approach, MalGAN, consists of a generator that trans-
forms a malware feature vector into its adversarial version
by only adding a random number of API calls. Anderson et
al. [5] used deep reinforcement learning to generate adversar-
ial examples against a gradient boosted decision tree model.
The deep reinforcement learning model consists of an agent
and an environment. However, their preliminary RL model
provided only 1% improvement of the evasion rate over ran-
dom selection. Kolosnjaji et al. [28] proposed to conduct
white-box gradient-based adversarial attacks on deep learning
model MalConv [49], which directly takes the raw bytes of
the binaries as input. The paper observes that to achieve a
high evasion rate an attacker needs to append a significant
amount of garbage data at the end of a malware sample, which
makes these attacks easy to detect as they cannot manipulate
bytes at arbitrary locations. By generate adversarial samples
3https://nicholas.carlini.com/writing/2019/all-adversar
ial-example-papers.html
by changing few tens of bytes in the file header, Luca et
al. [15] demonstrated that MalConv differentiates benign and
malicious samples mostly based on characteristics of the file
header and ignores the data and code section.
A few papers discussed attacks against a dynamic classi-
fier [56], although all the attacks are performed in the feature
space. We are the first to demonstrate functionally active
malware can evade real-world dynamic classifiers and harm
real users.
Demetrio [15] leverages integrated gradients to find the
influential features for black-box decisions of an ML-based
malware classifier MalConv. Their results show that Mal-
Conv only learns patterns from the file header part of binaries,
not important data and code sections. However, the paper
manipulated the byte-level features without manipulating the
actual file. LIME [50] is an explanatory model that distorts
the inputs by blacking out random regions and then checking
its impact on outputs to identify the influential regions to
classification. LEMNA [19] is a modified version of LIME
customized for a security domain, which learns the interpre-
tation with the sequential RNN (Recurrent Neural Network)
model. The manipulations on samples in both LIME and
LEMNA do not guarantee the sample is still executable and
functionality-preserving when applied in malware adversarial
domain. However, all these three approaches are conducted
on the byte level, not the feature level. A one-byte change that
alters the classification result may be because it breaks the
format of PE and thus its functionality, not because it is im-
portant to the identification of malware. So their explanation
method cannot be used for commercial AVs. Our approach
generates functional variants around the adversarial samples
using our safe action set, and provides a mapping from action
space to feature space. In this way, we can explain which
features are essential for the evasion of adversarial examples.
7 Conclusions
We design a generalized, systematic, automatic framework to
perform realistic adversarial attacks on real-world malware
detectors. We use in-place code randomization and code-
agnostic manipulations to generate adversarial examples. To
explain why evasion occurs, we design an algorithm to fil-
ter out the actions that are ineffective for adversarial sample
generation. For each commercial and open-source antivirus
system, we compute the cost to the attacker and the effec-
tiveness of the attack on static and dynamic classifiers, the
effectiveness of each action and the key features that cause
evasions. Our results show that it is easy to evade the static
detectors of commercial AV, and that many of the adversarial
attacks are transferable between different antivirus systems.
Additionally, when the static classifier of antivirus systems are
evaded, these adversarial samples can be used to test the dy-
namic classifier, which is a new attack surface for adversarial
examples to do real harm to users.
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A Algorithm of Action Sequence Minimizer
See Algorithm 3
Algorithm 3: Action Sequence Minimization
Input :malware sample s, evasive sample seva, malware
classifier f
Output :minimized sample smin
1 q← getActionSeq(seva)
2 action_idxs← [0, . . . , len(q)−1]
3 deleted_idxs← []
4 foreach idx ∈ action_idxs do
5 q′← q
6 q′[idx]← None
7 foreach idx′ ∈ deleted_idxs do
8 q′[idx′]← None
9 end
10 s′← s
11 foreach action ∈ q′ do
12 if action 6= None then
13 content← parseLog(action.idx)
14 s′← applyAction(s′,action,content)
15 end
16 end
17 if isEvasive( f , s′) then
18 deleted_idxs.append(idx)
19 smin← s′
20 else
21 action← q[idx]
22 updateActionWeight( f ,action)
23 content← parseLog(action.idx)
24 saveSuccContent(content)
25 end
26 end
27 return smin
B Effective Action Combinations
See Figure 10.
C Broken Malware Examples
Case 1: Implementation errors in instruction replacement.
As shown in Figure 11, the original implementation of code
randomization only supports 8-bit and 32-bit, not 16-bit in-
struction. It tries to replace a 16-bit add/sub instruction in a
wrong way (assuming 32-bit format). It treats the last four
bytes as the second operand, but actually, only the last two
bytes are the second operand. This would break the CFG of
the program.
Case 2: Overwriting overlay. As shown in Figure 12, when
adding a new section at the end of the last section, if the
sample has overlay data, the added new data may affect the
overlay data extraction of the malware.
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Figure 10: Effective Action Combinations for Adversarial Sample Generation: For EMBER, addition of random bytes to the end
of the binary is overwhelmingly the most effect action for fooling the classifier. Addition of just one byte to the end of a section
or to the end of the file can create adversarial examples for ClamAV. And, addition of a new section is the most effective action
for creating adversarial samples for all the four commercial AVs. For AV1, AV3 and AV4, addition of a section with just one
byte can create adversarial samples.
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